THEORETICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SPHOTA DOCTRINE

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The most important feature in Bhartrhari’s Linguistic theory is the Sphota. He introduces the term Šabda and the concept Šabda in very technical senses.

Firstly Bhartrhari divides the concept of Šabda into two aspects as follows:

1. **Anvākhyeya Šabda** Linguistically relevant unit
2. **Pratipādaka Šabda** The exponent of linguistically relevant Šabda through which the former is realized.

A major part of Vol. I. of the Vākyapadiya is devoted to the discussion of Šabda with regard to these two aspects. Šabda, for Bhartrhari, since he calls it upādāna Šabda (‘linguistic element which is inseparably associated with meaning’),

is a meaningful concept. This implies that only meaningful units are employed in language. In this upadānasadba, two aspects are distinguished by linguists, namely:

3. **The nimitta or the conceptual base of Šabda,**
4. **The Śruti**: that which conveys the underlying meaning in terms of serially-ordered articulated sound sequences.

**Vṛtti** defines these two terms as follows:

“The nimitta is the base on which the speech sounds (śrutayah) convey meaning. The other one, (i.e. śruti) is the audible speech sounds distinctively produced by the articulatory organs, and which as the conveyers, always depend on the meaning to be conveyed.”

Of these two divisions, nimitta corresponds to anvākhyasabda while sruti corresponds to pratipādakasabda. Accordingly the two aspects of śabda for Bhartrhari are:

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1. See F. R. Palmer, 1965 : 5,10,30
2. V.P 1: 44; *Vṛtti* : 100; of J. Brough, 1951 : 37 who translate upādāna śabda as Language
A. The underlying aspect which is connected with the notion of meaning, and,

B. The phonological aspect which is connected with speech sounds.  

A clear understanding of this division is vital in an attempt to investigate the postulation of the concept sphota.  

DHVANI AS THE (SURFACE) REALIZATION OF SABDA. THE UNDERLYING PHONOLOGICAL STRUCTURE.

Bhartrhari introduces the sphota first in his discussion of sabda as a mentalistic concept (i.e. the aspect which is connected with the notion of meaning). He also says that the speech sounds which reveal the underlying sabda are called by the terms śruti, ānada or dhvani (prākṛta and vaikr̥ta). Bhartrhari gives a comprehensive description of the phonetics of speech sounds referring to various views of phoneticians and philosophers, while his main stress is on the description of speech production in terms of articulatory phonetics. When these views are taken together, it appears that three things are involved in the analysis of speech, namely: knowledge, “Pulmonic air” and “distinctive features.” The jñāna knowledge transforms itself into its surface form and makes it audible through speech sounds produced by passage of pulmonic air through the articulatory organs. The sounds so produced can be analysed into anus ‘atoms’ i.e. distinctive features. This, in other words, is an illustration of how the speaker’s knowledge of a certain meaning is revealed through the dhvani. Bhartrhari has not specified ‘the atoms’ into which the speech sounds are analyzable. Nāgēśa says that ‘atoms’ in this context refer to sabda tanmātras of the “sāṇkya philosophy.” Sabdatanmātras are subtle sound features, bundle of which constitute a sound unit i.e. a phoneme. Although this definition of sounds is similar to the modern view of distinctive features, no evidence is


5. All the translations of V P I : 44, it seems to me, have taken (A) to be the surface phonological concept and the latter (i.e. B) as the one that bears the meaning. This seems contrary to Bhartrhari’s view, for śruti clearly distinguishes the two, as seen in the present translation. The mistranslation of this stanza has led scholars like K. K. Raja even to consider prākṛte dhvani as the nimitta of sabda. See K. K. Raja, : 1963 : 117; Iyer, 1969 : 157.


7. For a similar usage of the term ‘atom’ see Bolinger, 1965.


9. svasaiktau vyajyamāṇāyaṁ pratyutpna samirītaḥ abhirātmā praciṣyante sabdāyāḥ paramānavah (V P I : 111).
available to prove that Bhartrhari made a distinctive feature analysis of phonetic sounds. Nevertheless it is important that he mentions that the dhvanis or śrutiś which reveal the sphota are analysable into such features according to others. The dhvanis thus produced and analysed in terms of knowledge, speaker’s intention, pulmonic air and distinctive features, are the conveyers of the underlying meaning. The śūkṣmaśabda ‘subtle śabda (i.e. the spota) is not perceptible, it can only be revealed through its revealers (i.e. the dhvanis) just as the existence of air is revealed by a fan (V P I : 116). It is only when revealed through dhvanis that the difference of the musical notes Śadja, daivata, niśada etc., are distinguishable, otherwise they remain unperceived. Thus every type of expression depends on the revealing dhvanis which represent the underlying meaning (V P I : 118 - 123). This makes it clear that dhvani, nāda or śruti are the means by which the meaning is conveyed. It is not possible to isolate these dhvanis in language because they are inex- tricably bound up with the other aspect of śabda i.e. the sphota. Bhartrhari makes it clear that śabda and arthā (‘revealing dhvani and meaning) are two aspects of the same thing. These dhvanis, as has been seen, have various properties. Primarily there are two types of dhvani which Bhartrhari distinguishes as prākṛtadhvani and vaikṛtadhvani (V P I : 75 - 77). One property of prākṛtadhvani is kāla ‘temporal distinction’, because they are produced in a temporal sequence. Among the speech sounds so produced, some are ‘short’ in duration, some are ‘long’ and some are ‘still longer’. This length of duration belongs to prākṛtadhvani. Since they are so produced in a linear order they share the property of space as well. Vṛtti says: that

‘the sphota will not be manifested without the prakṛtadhvani. The restriction of the sphota (as consisting of a particular meaning) to a particular sequence of sounds is made by these sounds. In other words prakṛtadhvani is the representation of the sphota. The sentences of equal length uttered by Garga and others for instance, are recognized differently because of their specific arrangement of items. Some are recognized as having many recurrent patterns of utterance and some as having few recurrent patterns, and also the utterance with shorter and longer duration are all recognized at this level of dhvani.”

10 ekasyātmano bhedau śabdārthaḥ apanthaksthitaḥ (V P II : 31).
11. An ancient grammarian referred to even in the Nirukta.
12. “iha dividho dhvanih prakṛto vaikṛtasca tatra prakṛtam nāma yena vina sphotasvarupam anabhivyaktam na paricchidyate. Vaikṛtáṣṭu yanabhivyaktam sphotarupam punah punah aviccchedaḥ pracitataram kālam upalabhyyate
This seems to mean that prâkṛtadhvani is the abstract realization of speech sounds, because the difference between items having many recurrent patterns and that have few recurrent patterns is realized on this level. It is unfortunate that Vṛtti does not quote the sentences that it refers to as those of Gārgya and others, which would have been of immense importance to illustrate this point. When two or more individuals utter sentences of equal length there may be differences in the taxonomy of their sounds. Some may be short, some may be long, these variations relate to a given structure13 at this level. Therefore, it can be inferred that prâkṛtadhvani is the abstract phonological system of a given language. This discussion makes it clear that the phonological structure has a two way relation. It is an output of the sphota on the one hand, through which it relates to the notion of meaning, and it is the input, on the other hand, to the phonetic utterance.14 Accordingly prâkṛtadhvani is a bundle of distinctive features produced by articulatory organs and shares the prosodic features of spatio-temporal distinction (which belongs to the whole phonological structure and not to individual phonemes). For example; the sequence of discreet sound segments/bhavati/ 'becomes' is the phonological representation of an underlying semantic element.

Vṛtti (143-144), explains the other aspect of dhvani i.e. vaikṛtadhvani as similar to a light. When the light is lit, it makes the objects such as a jar etc., perceptible. As long as the light exists the objects are also perceptible. The qualities that belong to the light are not attributed to the objects. Similarly the Vaikṛtadhavanis are the speech sounds with all individual variations (i.e. the idiosyncratic features of individual speakers). As long as these phonetic utterances last, they reveal the underlying structure i.e. the sphota. But the idiosyncratic features are not part of the sphota, because these speech sounds do not represent the sphota but only reveal it. When these vaikṛtadhavanis reach the ears of the hearer, he understands the meaning that the speaker intends to convey despite all the idiosyncratic features that are carried by the sound sequences. These sound sequences are distinguishable as not contributing to the phonological structure of a given language. That is to say, a speaker makes an utterance ghatah ('a pot') for instance, which may be heard with all vaikṛtadhavanis associated with it which may be 'ghatah' or 'gatah' etc., with or without aspiration of the first plosive, or with a slight aspiration as in 'ghatah'; the vocalic element (a) may be a lowered, centralized or raised variety; the intervocalic [i] may be a retroflex [i] or an alveolar [j] etc.).15 Yet the hearer grasps the underlying semantic content in spite of all such idiosyncratic features.16 Even though this is uttered at a fast, medium or slow speed, the hearer grasps

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13. Structure here implies any possible combination of C V.
14. cf. "primary sounds cause the perception of the sphota as well as the secondary sounds" S. D. Joshi, 1967, 22 - 29.
15. The section within brackets is to clarify the point at issue.

Bhartrhari mentions a few views on the perception of speech sounds where he says that according to some these sounds prepare the ear to perceive the meaning conveyed by them by purifying the ear and awakening the sense of perceptibility.
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the sphota through which he conceives the intended meaning. The phonemes of this utterance are identified within the phonemic system of Sanskrit as/tat - sisya/, which are the prākrtadhvani. The final /-t/ and the initial /-s/-in/tat - sisya/ are phonemes or abstract units. /-t/ has a phonemic variant (-c) in the environment of /-s/- and /-s/- has a phonemic variant (ch-) in the environment of (-c). All this amounts to saying that the hearer reconstructs in his mind the phonological structure of the language concerned when he hears the utterance with all variations.

According to the foregoing discussion it appears that the two kinds of dhvani correspond to the two types of phonological structure of the generative phonologists, that is to say, the vaikrtadhvani is similar to the 'Systematic phoretic structure' which is a sequence of discrete segments of sounds. prakrtadhvani is similar to the 'systematic phonemic structure' where the representation is more abstract.

SPHOTA AS THE (UNDERLYING) SYNTACTIC - SEMANTIC STRUCTURE OF ŚABDA

Having made it clear that dhvani with all variations is the (surface) phonological aspect of śabda, it is necessary now to investigate the exact status of the sphota in Bhartrhari's theory. The term sphota occurs only nine times in the Vākyapadiya and of these at least five are references to the views of others on the subject. By a close scrutiny of the term where it refers to Bhartrhari's own view, it was concluded that the term is used to refer to a concept connected with the motion of meaning. In the previous section it was assumed that the terms anvākhyāśabda, nimitta, and sphota all refer to the same concept, i.e., the linguistically relevant unit that underlies all meaningful utterances and this is represented by the phonological structure of a given language. This implies that the sphota is a linguistic universal. Bhartrhari in his discussion of different views on "the sentence" gives three views that belong to "the school of sentence meaning theory", namely:

I The sentence is an indivisible unit.
II The sentence stands for a generic or universal meaning (jāti)
III The sentence is a mentalistic concept.

18. /-t/-c (ch)/-s/.
/-s/ (ch) /-c / tat - sisya / tac - siya / tacchisya
cf. elektrik + iti /- tektris + iti;
spešifik + iti /- spešifis + iti.
20. cf. "......Its fundamental attachment is to the other side (not sound) of the linguistic situation, namely: the meanings. In its non-technical sense sphota means simply 'a bursting - a splitting open' and it is normally defined in its linguistic sense as 'that from which the meaning bursts forth, i.e. shines forth. J. Brough 1951 : 33 ff.
21. see Chapter 1.3.2. Bhartrhari's linguistic theory as represented in the Vākyapadiya. Dr. K. Mahanama
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Punyarāja (67:81), says that these views refer to the sphota which is an indivisible unit. In describing the third view, Bhartrhari says that, "that mental concept (antahābda tattvam) is an abstract unit and is revealed by nāda 'speech sounds'. Others call this mental concept by the name śabda. Thus both the terms refer to the same concept in the sentences". Although Punyarāja makes it explicit that this is a description of the sphota, he does not comment on the term śabda in this statement. But as noted above, Bhartrhari uses the term śabda that refers to the mentalistic concept as a synonym of the sphota.22 Accordingly the sentence is an abstract concept called the sphota and it exists in the mind of the pratipatras ('interlocutors'). It is a unit with no parts, a universal revealed by speech sounds. This description of "the sentence" is compatible with what Bhartrhari says about the sphota in that it is a universal and is revealed by nādas or dhvanis. This it seems is substantial evidence for the argument that the sphota, for Bhartrhari, is an abstract concept (i.e. the underlying structure of sentences which resemble "the base" of the standard theory.23) Patarjali uses the term samghāta to refer to the unit in which all semantic information is contained.24
The same term is used by Bhartrhari in this context to refer to a union of lexical morphemes (in a given order) and states that the sphota is what underlies this union of lexical morphemes.25 Patarjali and Bhartrhari agree that the meanings of these lexical morphemes cannot be assigned to them individually. For Patarjali it is in the samghāta that meaning lies, while for Bhartrhari it is the sphota. This sphota, Bhartrhari explains, is like a reflection. The reflection of a mountain in a pool of water is different from that of a mirror, or the blade of a Chinese dagger, or any other such reflector. The reflection, although it is realized according to the reflectors, is independent of them. Similarly the sphota is revealed in different patterns of dhvanis (in different languages) (V P I. 49). According to Bhartrhari the yolk of an egg or a Seed in which all the substances exist and which matures into a developed bird or a tree respectively is similar to the sphota. That is to say, all the syntactic and semantic information of a well-formed and acceptable utterance is available in the sphota (V P I: 51). Just as the well formedness of a bird or a tree is the property of the yolk or the seed respectively, the well-formed conditions of an utterance are in the sphota, and hence it is generative. Although the sphota consists of all the syntactic and semantic information it is not the semantic content (artha) of the utterance,

22 yadantarā śabdatattvam tu nādairekam prakāśitam tam āhur apare śabdam tasya vākye tathaikatā (V P II : 30 ; PR : 64,81).
Patanjali does not identify samghāta with the sphota.
25 Punyarāja, in a different context identifies samghāta with the sphota in that sanghata ('union') is revealed by parts whereas the sphota is revealed by dhvanis. (PR :173).
but rather the bearer of the latter. For Bhartrhari śabda and artha are two distinct units of language. Artha (grāhya ‘to be perceived’) is the "meaning" or the semantic content where as śabda (grāhaka perceiver) which bears the meaning is the underlying structure of the utterance (V P I : 5:II 123, 188). It is obvious that Bhartrhari refers to three distinct notions of language, viz :

I Artha ‘meaning or semantic content’.
II Śabda ‘the underlying structure’
III Dvani ‘the phonological structure’.

There are two types of relations between these notions. The relation between :

\[ \text{artha and śabda is vācyā and vācaka} \]

the conveyed and the conveyer’, while that between śabda and dvani is vyāgyā and vyājaka ‘the revealed and the revealer’.

The relation between ‘meaning’ or semantic content and underlying structure is not specified by Bhartrhari. But he gives a good account of how the sphota is mapped on to the surface phonological structure, and this is mainly in terms of similes. The sphota is like a painting, unitarily perceived in the mind of the painter. He paints this in a particular order beginning from a certain point and going on to complete the picture. There exist a number of stages between the first stage and the last. The painting is acceptable as well-formed only after the last stage has been completed. The intermediate stages neither belong to the unitarily perceived original painting nor to the terminal one resulting from the completion of the last stage, and these intermediate stages are inexpressible (V P I : 51 - 52. Similar examples are the process of milk turning into curd and a seed maturing into a tree in a number of stages (V P I : 91). The process of mapping the sphota onto dvani is similar to this. There is a specific order through which the sphota becomes revealed in terms of dvani. The stages in between them are anupākhya ‘inexpressible’, in that they are neither sphota nor dvani but are in the process of undergoing transformations, just as in the process of milk turning into curd and to similar phenomena referred to above. Those intermediate transformations (i.e. the derived structures) which are the result of the application of a set of rules in a sequential order, transforming each derived structure gradually into its surface form, are only a helpful device to arrive at the phonetic structure which is its final realization. Accordingly it is reasonable to assume that the sphota which is the underlying structure of sentences is mapped on to the surface structure in terms of a set of grammatical transformations (which Bhartrhari calls āvrtti (V P I : 85), that are applied in a particular order. Unless this set of transformational rules is properly operated the output will be an ill-formed string, just as a rope

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26. See also Nagesa’s Sphota-vada : 5; Kavya’s Prādipika


28. cf “The cardinal fact about the manifestation of the sphota is that before it takes place one cognizes (sic.) certain verbal elements which are unreal and appear to be part of the sphota” Iyer, 1969 166.
may appear like a snake due to a blurred vision or darkness, or a tree may be mistaken for an elephant at a distance or under conditions that obstruct proper vision (V P I : 89-91; Vrtti : 185).

Some later grammarians and philosophers have tried to explain this process of mapping the sreshtha onto dhvanis in a way similar to the “differentiation/theory” developed by Buddhist philosophers. The well-known example given by sesakrsna is the realization of the utterance kamalam ‘lotus’. When a person utters the sound ka, it differentiates all the other possible combinations such as pa, ta, ga etc., and when he proceeds to the next syllable (ka) ma all the other possibilities such as (ka) pa, (ka) ta etc., are excluded. When the last syllable is reached (kama) lam the sphota kamalam becomes revealed by ruling out all the other possibilities such as *kamam *kamaram, ganaam etc. According to this view the gradual building up of the higher unit (i.e. the morpheme) by the syllables is the way that the Sphota is conceived. This seems to be a description of a phonemic make-up of an utterance built up from the syllables of a given language, but Bhartrhari’s conception of the manifestation of the sphota goes deeper than just a surface phonological arrangement of phonemes.

THREE COMPONENTS OF LANGUAGE
(PASYANTI, MADHYAMĀ, VAIKHARI)

Bhartrhari introduces three components of language which are also the components of Brahman. Since these seem to be playing a major role in Bhartrhari’s theory a brief account of them will be in order here. These components literally mean:

I Paśyanti ‘the seeing one’
II Madhyamā ‘the intermediate one’
III Vaikhari ‘the externalized (articulated) one.

The commentators and later grammarians quote these three, in their discussions of the philosophy of speech production, not in the linguistic sense, but as a description of mūrtivivartavāda (‘the revelation of the ādyabrahman’) of monistic philosophy. This has sometimes resulted in confusion as to the aims of Bhartrhari in establishing these components. Bhartrhari

29. For a detailed account of this theory see Dhirendrasarma 1969 : 19-46
30. Sphottattvavirupana, p. 10; see also K. K. Raja, 1963 : 129
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does not elaborate on these points apart from saying that grammar is an account of language which consists of these three components (V P I : 142). Vrtti, however, gives a detailed account as follows:

**Paśyanti** ‘It is sequenceless, and though indivisible has the potentiality to produce sequence. It is static as well as non-static (calācalā). It is where the speaker’s intentions are met with (pratilabdha samādhāna). It consists of standard as well as non standard forms. It is difficult to pinpoint, because of its subleness and quasi formlessness (pratilīnākāra). It appears as limited or unlimited (sāmsṛṣṭa) meanings. It is where all meanings have ended (i.e. all semantic information is included in this). Some think that this meaningfulness exists at all levels of linguistic analysis and that is what distinguishes the well-formed from the ill-formed expressions. The semantic information contained in this, guides the speakers to use the well-formed expressions. Others, however think that paśyanti is free from ill-formed expressions, or non-standard forms and is beyond ordinary usage. This aspect of language is understood through correct knowledge of grammar or through the śabdapūrvvayoga’

**Madhyamā** ‘Madhyamā is that which exists in the mind (of the speaker before the expression is produced by articulatory organs). It appears as if it has specific order, and the mind is its source. That is to say Madhyamā is a set of intermediate stages that appear in a specific order resembling the mental transformations in the derivation of an expression up to its articulatory production (i.e. surface arrangement of morphemes). According to another view, in Madhyamā the specific order is not obvious. Nevertheless it is associated with subtle breath-force, as opposed to Vaikhari which is associated with gross breath force’.

**Vaikhari** ‘Vaikhari is understood by hearers because it can be heard as a specific sequence of sounds that occur in successive morphemes (anupūrvviniyatam), of an expression. It is connected speech, which represents in distinct phoremes well-formed and (sometimes) ill-formed expressions. (bhṛstāsēmskāra). It is infinite in its varieties in that even the sounds of the axle of a cart, a drum, a flute or a lute are also its representations.’

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Theoretical Significance of the Sphota

Following the above description in the Vṛtti it is not unreasonable to conclude that these three aspects are the three components of language. The domain of grammar, according to Bhartrhari is these three components. Later grammarians have also accepted that these three components represent three stages of speech production, and have developed a philosophy of śabdabrahman which explain the process of the manifestation of the "Supreme Reality" (i.e. Brahman) through various stages and appears finally as "Speech". In this philosophy the three components correspond to the three stages of śabdabrahman, revealing itself through the speech. These śabdabrahman philosophers have also developed the "śabdapurvayoga theory" as a means of realizing the Supreme Speech Principle. According to this theory the speaker starts from Vaikhari and develops his mind through Madhyamā to Pasyanti, and becomes identical with pasyanti. Grammar, on the other hand, starts from Pasyanti and arrives at Vaikhari through Madhyamā. Some modern scholars are of the opinion that Bhartrhari himself develops a Monistic philosophy which is represented by these three aspects. It is, however, difficult to make such judgements alone, because the text of the Vākyapadīya does not elaborate on these points. On the other hand, the fact that the introduction of these components immediately follows the statements on the importance of grammar, shows that these three components for Bhartrhari, are linguistic rather than philosophical concepts. The characterization of Pasyanti in the Vṛtti as, "the province where speaker's intentions are met with, and that which consists of standard and non-standard forms where the restricted and general meaning is accounted for, and as the deepest level of semantic analysis which is understood by the correct knowledge of grammar etc., shows that this level corresponds more closely to the semantic component in the system of Generative grammar although it is obviously more than that. Madhyamā according to the definition of the Vṛtti, is a set of stages through which the meaning at the deepest level is transformed into Vaikhari. This stage is purely mental and is characterized as the stage preceding the surface phonological form of the expression. It assumes sequence in the sense that it operates in an ordered manner. The function of this aspect is to map the semantic contents onto its phonetic representation. This, in other words, is the domain of all grammatical transformations. Since all these transformations are mental, they are intermediate between the semantic relation connected with the deepest aspect of mind and the surface realization. This description corresponds to the characterization of the syntactic component of Generative grammar as the domain of a system of recursive transformational rules that apply cyclically to generate the surface phonological form of an expression.

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36. Jayaratha (1170 A.D.) Rāmakānta (950) A.D.
   G.N. Sastri : 1959 : 66-82
37. Loc. Cit.
38. See footnote 33
   see also J. F. Staal, 1969 : 520.

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Vaikhari, on the other hand, is characterized as the domain of articulatory and auditory phonological sound units in which the temporal sequence is distinctive.\textsuperscript{43} In this structure the sequence of phonemes is arranged in an innumerable variety of shapes which are the representations of well- or ill-formed utterances. This structure represents the fully externalized human speech.

The above description of Vaikhari is in keeping with the characteristics of the phonological component outlined in Chomsky, 1957, 1965 and other Generative models.\textsuperscript{44} Accordingly, these three aspects paśyantī, madhyamā and vaikhari, correspond roughly to the semantic syntactic and phonological components respectively of Generative grammar. This comparison, however does not suggest that Bhartrhari's theory is a comprehensive and well developed model of Generative grammar. What this in fact suggests is that the insights of a Generative grammatical system can be traced from Bhartrhari's statements by following the line of arguments that has been extended so far in the present work.

It is accepted as in the present discussion that Bhartrhari's grammar incorporates these three components, the crucial point, however, is to specify the status of the sphota within his theory. As is evident from the information given so far, the sphota does not belong to Vaikhari, because the former is definitely not a surface phonological unit, but a syntactic semantic unit. Whether it belongs to Madhyamā or Paśyanti or whether it has any relation to these components at all remains to be seen. As was pointed out before Bhartrhari establishes three distinct notions of language, i.e. artha, śabda and dhvani (the total meaning or semantic content, the underlying structure and the phonological structure respectively). It is obvious that artha relates to paśyanti, since the latter is where all semantic information (linguistic as well as extra-linguistic) is restored. Dhvani, on the other hand, shows a direct relation to the contents of vaikhari, because both appear to have phonological structure as their domain. If this symmetrical order is followed, the sphota then has to be related to madhyamā or the syntactic component. The correspondence can thus be illustrated as:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{L} \\
\item \textbf{Paśyanti}  \quad \textbf{Madyamā}  \quad \textbf{Vaikhari} \\
\item (semantic component) \quad (syntactic component) \quad (phonological component) \\
\item \textbf{Artha}  \quad \textbf{Śabda/Sphota}  \quad \textbf{Dhvani} \\
\end{itemize}

\textbf{Diagram I.}

This observation seems to claim that the sphota corresponds to a sub component of the syntactic component of Generative grammar, but its justification needs further observation.

Theoretical Significance of the Sphota

The characterization of Madhyamā in the Vṛtti as the domain of a set of specifically ordered intermediate rules which gradually transforms each stage into well-formed-ness in the derivation of an expression does not, however, substantiate the above claim since, the sphota is not a set of transformations but it is what underlies a set of transformations. In this sense, the sphota resembles the "underlying base" that generates structures similar to base phrase markers, which are transformed into a string of morphemes that can be represented as:

S. ———— T₁ ———— T₂ ———— T₃ ———— ... ———— Tₙ.

Where S = the sphota (base) and Tₙ is the surface structure. T₁ ... Tₙ are anupākhyayas 'inexpressible structures' (derivable by the operation of a set of transformational rules called āvṛtti). These inexpressible stages are not regarded as well-formed utterances because the well-formed-ness depends on the culmination of these transformations (āvṛttiparipāka).

It is also important to notice the difference between madhayamā component of Bhartṛhari's theory and the syntactic component of the standard theory. In the latter the syntactic component consists of two subcomponents: the base and the transformational component. The generative capacity is a property of the base components. Madhyamā on the other hand does not consist of two such subcomponents, but only a set of transformational rules. Consequently, sphota which is the nearest equivalent of "the base of the standard theory, cannot be assigned to madhyamā of Bhartṛhari's theory. Accordingly, the theory illustrated in diagram I needs to be revised so that pāsyanti, the semantic component comprises both artha, the total meaning and sphota, the underlying base that represents the semantic and syntactic information that is linguistically relevant. The function of madhyamā then, is to transform the output of pāsyanti to vaikhari. This revised theory can be illustrated by the following diagram.

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45. āvṛttiparipākāyāṁ buddhau Šabdovadhāryate (V.P.I: 84).
Bhartrhari’s theory differs from the standard theory in that the former assigns the sphota to the semantic component, whereas in the standard theory its equivalent (i.e. base) is a sub component of the syntactic component.

The evidence that has been adduced serves to confirm that the sphota according to Bhartrhari, is an underlying structure which represents the semantic and syntactic structure of an expression, which seems to be more a kin to the “semantic representations” of the Generative semanticists theory. This underlying structure is mapped on to the phonetic’ representation via an intermediate set of transformations.

RELATIONSHIP OF SPHOTA AND PRATIBHĀ

G. N. Sastri identifies the sphota with pratibhā, in that pratibhā and the sphota are not two different entities (1959 : 91). Commentators like Puryanāraja, use the term pratibhā as an equivalent of pasyanti (2.3.2.), which is the ultimate meaning of verbal propositions, and is considered as being an unbroken intuition. The term pratibhā literally means ‘correct or proper understanding’. In the literature of poetics it is defined as “the knowledge or the intuition that generates ever increasing aesthetic senses”. It is through pratibhā that the speaker understands a linguistic proposition. Bhartrhari uses the term pratibhā to refer to innate, and effortlessly inborn intuition of the pratipatrā (interlocutors) which is an essential factor in understanding and producing meaningful sentences. He mentions six types of pratibhās, viz:

I Innate.
II Achieved by behaviour or performance.
III Achieved by physical experience.
IV Achieved by psychological experience.
V Achieved by unspecified causes.
VI Achieved by specified causes.

47. G. N. Sastri, 1959 : 251 - 252
48. Pratibhā is a word stemming from prati, meaning opposite and bhā meaning speech.
49. i. Pratibhā navanavonmesa salini prajnā -
    ii. apurva vastu Nirmānakṣamā Pratibhā - Abhinavagupta
50. Svabhāva caranābhyāsa yogadrstapadādita viśiṣṭopahitā ceti pratibhām ṣadvīdham viduh (V P II : 152)
    See also V P II : 143 - 152; PR : 141-143.
These are in fact, six ways of describing how the intuition of the interlocutors is achieved. Bhartrhari's *pratibhā* is not restricted to human beings and their capacity for language. It is an innate capacity of other species as well. For example the capacity of Cuckoo to sing in the spring, and birds to fly, spiders to weave their nets etc. In this sense, *pratibhā* covers a wide range of capacities. Helārāja, identifies *pratibhā* with consciousness (V P III :1) Naiyayikas and Vaiśēsikas think that it is the only valid source of knowledge. This term has its philosophical connotations developed in different schools of philosophy. It is not, however proposed to give such details in the present study.

Bhartrhari's use of the term *pratibhā* as "the intuition of the interlocutors which is innate as well as achieved and developed through psychological and physical experience" shows that it bears some similarity to the concept of "competence" of the speaker without which the understanding and producing of meaningful expressions would be impossible. Since *pratibhā*, in this sense is the underlying capacity that understands the sphota they cannot be identical. It is therefore, difficult to agree with Āstī. Punyaraśa's account on the other hand, implies that *pratibhā* includes total semantic information together with the environmental factors (i.e. contextual and situational), in Dell Hymes's sense. However an exact comparison of *pratibhā* with "competence" requires a thorough and a comparative study of both the concepts, Suffice it to say here, that Bhartrhari's *pratibhā* and the modern notion of "competence" though not the same, have similarities to a great extent.

Although *pratibhā* plays a considerable role in understanding the sphota, the relationship of the two has to be dealt with in a separate level of discussion i.e. in a theory of language acquisition.

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51. Whether the mode of communication of other species also has the same innate principles or whether they have only a limited range of capacities, is a question that has been widely argued by Behavioural psychologists, Socio-linguists and Biologists, See B. F. Skinner, 1957, Rodger Brown, 1970, Léneberg 1964, 1967. J. C. Marshall 1970, and many others.


55. Dell Hymes, 1970. See also, also, Halliday; Loc cit. Campbell and Roger Wales, Loc. cit.
CONCLUSION.

Considering the facts given above, it is possible to deduce the following conclusion:

Language, which comprises three components technically called Pas-yanti Madhayamā and Vaikhari, is meaningful in its account of both internal structure and external correlates such as contextual information. The total meaning thus conveyed is referred to as artha, 'meaning' which in this sense is more like the meaning in its "every day sense". Artha consists of a Linguistic base component as well as extralinguistic material. The linguistic base component which has both semantic and syntactic implications (that is to say which is more or less the equivalent of the Generative Semantics of "deep structure), is called śabda or the sphota. Śabda and sphota have been used synonymously to mean the linguistic deep structure abstracted from the overall pattern of language in order to distinguish it from extra-linguistic criteria which are equally relevant to communication. Śabda/sphota consists of syntactic deep structure, and phonological deep structure as well as lexis. The term for phonological deep structure is prākṛtadhvani. The term vyākaraṇa or śāstra ('grammar' has been used loosely with in the theory but seems to have a major part to play as a sub-component of śabda/sphota. The term for lexis is pada. The syntactic, phonological and lexical structures are derived from śabda/sphota through Certain transformations technically called āvṛtti. Although the rules themselves are not explicitly stated it seems to be the case that the concept of āvṛtti is very similar to the modern concept of transformations in Generative grammar. The phonetic structure of speech is like wise derivable from the phonological, grammatical and lexical structure, by the application of āvṛtti, (which are similar to phonological rules). The nature of the theory and the position of the sphota within the theory may be stated in a rough diagrammatic sketch as follows:

Theoretical Significance of the Sphota

ARTHĀ (Meaning)

SABDA/SPHOTA

(PRĀKRITI

ĀVṛTTI

VAIKRITIADHVANI

(PRĀKRITI

ĀVṛTTI

(PHRALOGICAL structure)

(PRATHAMIC structure)

(phonetic structure)
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